First Nations Land Title. Whose house rules?

If the first nations land title has been recognized, it has been recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada, what does that mean for first nations people and all non-first nations people living in B.C. (and elsewhere)?

How is “the Queen” (via agents) still making first nations and non-first nations people liable to “her laws” on land confirmed to be titled to another Nation other that Canada (or British Columbia etc.)?

Can I come into your house and tell you how to live? Can I tell your friends in your house how to act and punish you both if you disobey my commands (offend against my laws)?

Could this maybe explain part of it? THEORY: CANADA is a corporation and we are treated as it’s employees and first nations peoples who are “registered Indians” are governed under parens patrie guardianship (admitted in their own laws).

I know, I know, who would really do that to other human beings? Look at history – now, recent and ancient. Same story with modern twists. Modified game, same result.



Quoting Pat Callaghan :…. “It is illegal, and it always has been and Quote “For more than a century, Canada’s federal and provincial governments have assumed ownership of unceded lands without any clear legal basis for doing so. In effect, Aboriginal litigants argue, they’ve just taken it. Perhaps because no living Canadian has ever known it to be any other way, this state of affairs appears (at least to most non-Aboriginal people) to be both natural and entirely legal. What the Supreme Court said last year was, no, it isn’t. It is illegal, and it always has been.” 2014 SCC 44 (CanLII)[2014] 2 S.C.R. 256


Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] 2 SCR 257, 2014 SCC 44 (CanLII), <>



Roger William, on his own behalf, on behalf of all other members of the Xeni Gwet’in First Nations Government and on behalf of all other members of the Tsilhqot’in Nation



Her Majesty The Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia, Regional Manager of the Cariboo Forest Region and Attorney General of Canada


Indexed as:  Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia

The Supreme Court of British Columbia held that occupation was established for the purpose of proving title by showing regular and exclusive use of sites or territory within the claim area, as well as to a small area outside that area.  Applying a narrower test based on site-specific occupation requiring proof that the Aboriginal group’s ancestors intensively used a definite tract of land with reasonably defined boundaries at the time of European sovereignty, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the Tsilhqot’in claim to title had not been established.

                    Held:  The appeal should be allowed and a declaration of Aboriginal title over the area requested should be granted. A declaration that British Columbia breached its duty to consult owed to the Tsilhqot’in Nation should also be granted.

…. Excerpts from case summary …….

Where Aboriginal title has been established, the Crown must not only comply with its procedural duties, but must also justify any incursions on Aboriginal title lands by ensuring that the proposed government action is substantively consistent with the requirements of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. This requires demonstrating both a compelling and substantial governmental objective and that the government action is consistent with the fiduciary duty owed by the Crown to the Aboriginal group.  This means the government must act in a way that respects the fact that Aboriginal title is a group interest that inheres in present and future generations, and the duty infuses an obligation of proportionality into the justification process: the incursion must be necessary to achieve the government’s goal (rational connection); the government must go no further than necessary to achieve it (minimal impairment); and the benefits that may be expected to flow from that goal must not be outweighed by adverse effects on the Aboriginal interest (proportionality of impact). Allegations of infringement or failure to adequately consult can be avoided by obtaining the consent of the interested Aboriginal group.  This s. 35 framework permits a principled reconciliation of Aboriginal rights with the interests of all Canadians.


While unnecessary for the disposition of the appeal, the issue of whether the Forest Act applies to Aboriginal title land is of pressing importance and is therefore addressed.  As a starting point, subject to the constitutional constraints of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and the division of powers in the Constitution Act, 1867, provincial laws of general application apply to land held under Aboriginal title.  As a matter of statutory construction, the Forest Act on its face applied to the land in question at the time the licences were issued.  The British Columbia legislature clearly intended and proceeded on the basis that lands under claim remain “Crown land” for the purposes of the Forest Act at least until Aboriginal title is recognized.  Now that title has been established, however, the timber on it no longer falls within the definition of “Crown timber” and the Forest Act no longer applies.  It remains open to the legislature to amend the Act to cover lands over which Aboriginal title has been established, provided it observes applicable constitutional restraints.

This raises the question of whether provincial forestry legislation that on its face purports to apply to Aboriginal title lands, such as the Forest Act, is ousted by the s. 35 framework or by the limits on provincial power under the Constitution Act, 1867.  Under s. 35, a right will be infringed by legislation if the limitation is unreasonable, imposes undue hardship, or denies the holders of the right their preferred means of exercising the right.  General regulatory legislation, such as legislation aimed at managing the forests in a way that deals with pest invasions or prevents forest fires, will often pass this test and no infringement will result.  However, the issuance of timber licences on Aboriginal title land is a direct transfer of Aboriginal property rights to a third party and will plainly be a meaningful diminution in the Aboriginal group’s ownership right amounting to an infringement that must be justified in cases where it is done without Aboriginal consent.